strength, and, secondly, his guidance and direction by their _reason_
during the development of his reason. The second of these obligations is no
less imperious than the first. To expect him to provide the means of his
support from the resources of his own embryo strength, would imply no
greater misapprehension on the part of his father and mother than to look
for the exercise of any really controlling influence over his conduct by
his embryo reason. The expectation in the two cases would be equally vain.
The only difference would be that, in the failure which would inevitably
result from the trial, it would be in the one case the body that would
suffer, and in the other the soul.

_The Judgment more slowly developed than the Strength_.

Indeed, the necessity that the conduct of the child should be controlled by
the reason of the parents is in one point of view greater, or at least more
protracted, than that his wants should be supplied by their power; for
the development of the thinking and reasoning powers is late and slow in
comparison with the advancement toward maturity of the physical powers. It
is considered that a boy attains, in this country, to a sufficient degree
of strength at the age of from _seven to ten_ years to earn his living; but
his reason is not sufficiently mature to make it safe to intrust him with
the care of himself and of his affairs, in the judgment of the law, till he
is of more than twice that age. The parents can actually thus sooner
look to the _strength_ of the child for his support than they can to his
_reason_ for his guidance.

_What Parents have to do in Respect to the Reasoning Powers of Children_.

To aid in the development and cultivation of the thinking and reasoning
powers is doubtless a very important part of a parent's duty. But to