should meet with lawful impediment in the recovery of debts, and by the
new Constitution treaties had become part of the law of the land. On the
basis of a national jurisdiction in conflict with the Virginia statutes,
Giles acted so energetically, that he himself related that by 1792 he had
been employed in at least one hundred British debt cases, and was "as
successful in collecting monies under judgments as is usually the case
with citizens."

Comprehension of the true nature of the struggle in which Giles became
conspicuous must start with the fact that the Constitution was reluctantly
accepted and with great uneasiness as to possible consequences. In the
Virginia convention of 1788, it was declared that the new Constitution was
essentially a scheme of the military men to subject the people to their
rule. This argument was not so much met as avoided by the declaration that
there could be no tyranny while Washington lived. The rejoinder was
obvious: what if he should not be able to withstand military influence?
What if, in spite of him, the government should be given a dangerous
character that would develop after he passed away? Jefferson had felt
misgivings on this score from the first, and Madison experienced them as
soon as differences on practical measures arose between himself and
Hamilton. Jefferson and Madison wanted the government to be made
respectable but not strong. Hamilton saw what they could not see--and
indeed what few at that time could see--that a government cannot be made
respectable without being made strong.

Washington was probably without any clear views of his own on
constitutional questions, and what evidence there is on this point
supports Jefferson's claim that Washington was more disposed to confide in
him and in Madison than in Hamilton. When Jefferson relinquished the State
Department, Washington proposed to give Madison the post, but was told he