would not think of taking it. Washington then transferred Randolph to the
position because he could not get anybody else of suitable capacity.
Whatever Washington's personal inclinations may have been, he was in a
position in which he had to act. Hamilton was the only one whom he could
find to show him the way, and thus circumstances more and more compelled
Washington to accept Hamilton's guidance, while at the same time it seemed
increasingly clear to the opposition that it was above all things
necessary to crush Hamilton. This state of sentiment must be kept in mind
in order to make intelligible the rabid violence of the party warfare
which had long been going on against Hamilton, and which--now that
Jefferson had left the Cabinet--was soon to be extended to Washington
himself.

When Giles went to the front in this war, both Jefferson and Madison were
busy behind the firing line supplying munitions. Giles was elected in 1790
to fill a vacancy caused by the death of Theodorick Bland, and took his
seat in the third session of the First Congress. The assumption bill had
been passed, but that was only the first of the series of financial
measures proposed by Hamilton, and Giles followed Madison's lead in
unsuccessful resistance to the excise and to the national bank. Giles was
re-elected to the Second Congress, which opened on October 24, 1791. In
the course of this session he became the leader of the opposition, not by
supplanting Madison but through willingness to take responsibilities from
which Madison, like Jefferson, shrank, because he, too, preferred activity
behind the scenes. This situation has often occurred in parliamentary
history--a zealous party champion scouting the scruples and restraints
that hampered the official leadership, and assuming an independent line of
attack with the covert favor and assistance of that leadership. In the
effort to crush Hamilton a series of raids was led by Giles, whose
appetite for fighting could never be extinguished no matter how severe