[11] Cf. "Econ." v. 7.

Here, too, is a maxim to engrave upon the memory: in charging a
superior force, never to leave a difficult tract of ground in the rear
of your attack, since there is all the difference in the world between
a stumble in flight and a stumble in pursuit.

There is another precaution which I feel called upon to note. Some
generals,[12] in attacking a force which they imagine to be inferior
to their own, will advance with a ridiculously insufficient force,[13]
so that it is the merest accident if they do not experience the injury
they were minded to inflict. Conversely, in attacking any enemy whose
superiority is a well-known fact, they will bring the whole of their
force into action.

[12] Or, "one knows of generals," e.g. Iphicrates at Oneion, 369 B.C.
Cf. "Hell." VI. v. 51.

[13] Lit. "an absolutely weak force."

Now, my maxim would be precisely converse: if you attack with a
prospect of superiority, do not grudge employing all the power at your
command; excess of victory[14] never yet caused any conqueror one pang
of remorse.

[14] Or, "a great and decided victory." Cf. "Hiero," ii. 16.

But in any attempt to attack superior forces, in full certainty that,
do what you can, you must eventually retire, it is far better, say I,
under these circumstances to bring a fraction only of your whole force