into action, which fraction should be the pick and flower of the
troops at your command, both horses and men. A body of that size and
quality will be able to strike a blow and to fall back with greater
security. Whereas, if a general brings all his troops into action
against a superior force, when he wishes to retire, certain things
must happen: those of his men who are worse mounted will be captured,
others through lack of skill in horsemanship will be thrown, and a
third set be cut off owing to mere difficulties of ground; since it is
impossible to find any large tract of country exactly what you would
desire. If for no other reason, through sheer stress of numbers there
will be collisions, and much damage done by kicks through mutual
entanglement; whereas a pick of horse and men will be able to escape
offhand,[15] especially if you have invention to create a scare in the
minds of the pursuers by help of the moiety of troops who are out of
action.[16] For this purpose false ambuscades will be of use.

[15] Or, "by themselves," reading {ex auton}, as L. Dind. suggests.
Cf. Polyb. x. 40. 6, or if as vulg. {ex auton} (sub. {kheiron},
Weiske), transl. "to slip through their fingers."

[16] Zeune and other commentators cf Liv. v. 38 (Diod. xiv. 114), but
the part played by the Roman subsidiarii at the battle of the
Allia, if indeed "una salus fugientibus," was scarcely happy.
Would not "Hell." VII. v. 26 be more to the point? The detachment
of cavalry and infantry placed by Epaminondas "on certain crests,
to create an apprehension in the minds of the Athenians" in that
quarter of the field at Mantinea was a {mekhanema} of the kind
here contemplated.

Another serviceable expedient will be to discover on which side a