else, which _may_, indeed, be thought conjointly, but which more
frequently _is not_ thought at all. He requires us to pack two distinct
judgments into one and the same proposition: he interpolates the meaning
of the Propositio Conversa _simpliciter_ into the form of the Propositio
Convertenda (when an universal Affirmative), and then claims it as a
great advantage, that the proposition thus interpolated admits of being
converted _simpliciter_, and not merely _per accidens_. Mr Mill is,
nevertheless, of opinion (pp. 439-443) that though 'the quantified
syllogism is not a true expression of what is in thought, yet writing
the predicate with a quantification may be sometimes a real help to the
Art of Logic.' We see little advantage in providing a new complicated
form, for the purpose of expressing in one proposition what naturally
throws itself into two, and may easily be expressed in two. If a man is
prepared to give us information on one Quaesitum, why should he be
constrained to use a mode of speech which forces on his attention at the
same time a second and distinct Quaesitum--so that he must either give
us information about the two at once, or confess himself ignorant
respecting the second?

The two next chapters of Mr Mill, noticing some other minor
peculiarities (all of them unfortunate, and one, p. 447, really
unaccountable) of Sir W. Hamilton's Formal Logic; and some Fallacious
Modes of Thought countenanced by Sir W. Hamilton (chs. xxiii.,
xxiv.--pp. 446, 478), we are compelled to pass over. We must find space,
however, for a few words on the Freedom of the Will (ch. xxv.), which
(in Mr Mill's language, pp. 488--549), 'was so fundamental with Sir W.
Hamilton, that it may be regarded as the central idea of his system--the
determining cause of most of his philosophical opinions.' Prior to Sir
W. Hamilton, we find some writers who maintain the doctrine of
Free-will, others who maintain that of Necessity: each supporting their