highest in their present intellectual life, as well as in their
practical aims and aspirations.']

[Footnote 2: We are happy to find such high authorities as Dr Whewell,
Mr Samuel Bailey, and Sir John Herschel concurring in this estimation of
the new logical point of view thus opened by Mr Mill. We will not call
it a _discovery_, since Sir John Herschel thinks the expression
unsuitable.--See the recent sixth edition of the 'System of Logic,' vol.
i. p. 229.]

[Footnote 3: See Sir William. Hamilton's 'Lectures on Logic' (Lect.
xvii. p. 320, 321; also Appendix to those Lectures, p. 361). He here
distinguishes also formal induction from, material induction, which
latter he brings under the grasp of syllogism, by an hypothesis in
substance similar to that of Whately. There is, however, in Lecture xix.
(p. 380), a passage in a very different spirit, which one might almost
imagine to have been written by Mr Mill: 'In regard to simple
syllogisms, it was an original dogma of the Platonic school, and an
early dogma of the Peripatetic, that science, strictly so called, was
only conversant with, and was exclusively contained in, universals; and
the doctrine of Aristotle, which taught that all our general knowledge
is only an induction from an observation of particulars, was too easily
forgotten or perverted by his followers. It thus obtained almost the
force of an acknowledged principle that everything to be known must be
known under some general form or notion. Hence the exaggerated
importance attributed to definition and deduction; it not being
considered that we only take out of a general notion what we had
previously placed therein, and that the amplification of our knowledge
is not to be sought for from above but from below--not from speculation
about abstract generalities, but from the observation of concrete