particulars. Bat however erroneous and irrational, the persuasion had
its day and influence, and it perhaps determined, as one of its effects,
the total neglect of one half, and that not the least important half of
the reasoning process.'

These very just observations are suggested to Sir William Hamilton by a
train of thought which has little natural tendency to suggest them,
viz., by the distinction upon which he so much insists, between the
logic of comprehension and the logic of extension, and by his anxiety to
explain why the former had been exclusively cultivated and the latter
neglected.

That which Sir William Hamilton calls here truly the doctrine of
Aristotle (enunciated especially at the close of the Analyt. Post.), and
which he states to have been forgotten by Aristotle's followers, was not
always remembered by Aristotle himself.]

[Footnote 4: The distinction is given by Stier and other logicians. 1.
Infinitum simpliciter. 2. Infinitum secundum quid, sive in certo
genere.]

[Footnote 5: This doctrine has been affirmed (so far as reason is
concerned, apart from revelation) not merely by Mr Mansel, but also by
Pascal, one of the most religious philosophers of the seventeenth
century, in the 'Pensées':--

'Parlons selon les lumieres naturelles. S'il y a un Dieu, il est
infiniment incompréhensible; puisque, n'ayant ni principes ni bornes, il
n'a nul rapport à nous; nous sommes done incapables de connâitre ni ce
qn'il est, ni s'il est.'--(See Arago, Biographie de Condorcet, p.