On the 5th of March, the present incumbent's first full day in office,
a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the
28th of February and received at the War Department on the 4th of March,
was by that Department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the
professional opinion of the writer that reenforcements could not be
thrown into that fort within the time for his relief rendered necessary
by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding
possession of the same, with a force of less than 20,000 good and
well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers
of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures
of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before
Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in
opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with
other officers, both of the Army and the Navy, and at the end of four
days came reluctantly, but decidedly, to the same conclusion as before.
He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was then
at the control of the Government or could be raised and brought to
the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be
exhausted. In a purely military point of view this reduced the duty
of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the
garrison safely out of the fort.

It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position under the
circumstances would be utterly ruinous; that the _necessity_ under which
it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would
be construed as a part of a _voluntary_ policy; that at home it would
discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go
far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that, in fact, it
would be our national destruction consummated. This could not be
allowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be