reached _Fort Pickens_ might be reenforced. This last would be a clear
indication of _policy_, and would better enable the country to accept
the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military _necessity_. An order was
at once directed to be sent for the landing of the troops from the
steamship _Brooklyn_ into Fort Pickens. This order could not go by land,
but must take the longer and slower route by sea. The first return news
from the order was received just one week before the fall of Fort
Sumter. The news itself was that the officer commanding the _Sabine_,
to which vessel the troops had been transferred from the _Brooklyn_,
acting upon some _quasi_ armistice of the late Administration (and of
the existence of which the present Administration, up to the time the
order was dispatched, had only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix
attention), had refused to land the troops. To now reenforce Fort
Pickens before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was impossible,
rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions in the latter-named
fort. In precaution against such a conjuncture the Government had a
few days before commenced preparing an expedition, as well adapted as
might be, to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was intended to
be ultimately used or not, according to circumstances. The strongest
anticipated case for using it was now presented, and it was resolved to
send it forward. As had been intended in this contingency, it was also
resolved to notify the governor of South Carolina that he might expect
an attempt would be made to provision the fort, and that if the attempt
should not be resisted there would be no effort to throw in men, arms,
or ammunition without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the
fort. This notice was accordingly given, whereupon the fort was attacked
and bombarded to its fall, without even awaiting the arrival of the
provisioning expedition.

It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was