knowledge of law, and ought to depend entirely upon knowledge of
men. We need exactly as much more knowledge as our task exceeds

that of the horse-dealer, but we can not do without knowledge of
humanity. The immense onerousness of the judge's office lies in
just the fact that he needs so very much more than his bare legal
knowledge. He must, before all things, be a jurist and not merely a
criminalist; he must be in full possession not only of the knowledge
he has acquired in his academy, but of the very latest up-to-date
status of his entire science. If he neglects the purely theoretical,
he degenerates into a mere laborer. He is in duty bound not only
to make himself familiar with hundreds of things, to be able to
consort with all sorts of crafts and trades, but also, finally, to form
so much out of the material supplied him by the law as is possible
to human power.

Section 4. (b) Integrity of Witnesses.


One of the criminal judge's grossest derelictions from duty consists
in his simply throwing the witness the question and in permitting
him to say what he chooses. If he contents himself in that,
he leaves to the witness's conscience the telling of the truth, and
the whole truth; the witness is, in such a case, certainly responsible
for one part of the untruthful and suppressed, but the responsibility
for the other, and larger part, lies with the judge who has failed to
do his best to bring out the uttermost value of the evidence,
indifferently for or against the prisoner. The work of education is
intended for this purpose,--not, as might be supposed, for training
the populace as a whole into good witnesses, but to make that