still kept his position as stadtholder, and with it his general
Europan policy. He found in England the sea power he needed, and used
the resources of Holland for the land war. This Dutch prince consented
that in the allied fleets, in councils of war, the Dutch admirals
should sit below the junior English captain; and Dutch interests at
sea were sacrificed as readily as Dutch pride to the demands of
England. When William died, his policy was still followed by the
government which succeeded him. Its aims were wholly centred upon the
land, and at the Peace of Utrecht, which closed a series of wars
extending over forty years, Holland, having established no sea claim,
gained nothing in the way of sea resources, of colonial extension, or
of commerce.

Of the last of these wars an English historian says: "The economy of
the Dutch greatly hurt their reputation and their trade. Their
men-of-war in the Mediterranean were always victualled short, and
their convoys were so weak and ill-provided that for one ship that we
lost, they lost five, which begat a general notion that we were the
safer carriers, which certainly had a good effect. Hence it was that
our trade rather increased than diminished in this war."

From that time Holland ceased to have a great sea power, and rapidly
lost the leading position among the nations which that power had built
up. It is only just to say that no policy could have saved from
decline this small, though determined, nation, in face of the
persistent enmity of Louis XIV. The friendship of France, insuring
peace on her landward frontier, would have enabled her, at least for a
longer time, to dispute with England the dominion of the seas; and as
allies the navies of the two continental States might have checked the
growth of the enormous sea power which has just been considered. Sea