peace between England and Holland was only possible by the virtual
subjection of one or the other, for both aimed at the same object.
Between France and Holland it was otherwise and the fall of Holland
proceeded, not necessarily from her inferior size and numbers, but
from faulty policy on the part of the two governments. It does not
concern us to decide which was the more to blame.

France, admirably situated for the possession of sea power, received a
definite policy for the guidance of her government from two great
rulers, Henry IV. and Richelieu. With certain well-defined projects of
extension eastward upon the land were combined a steady resistance to
the House of Austria, which then ruled in both Austria and Spain, and
an equal purpose of resistance to England upon the sea. To further
this latter end, as well as for other reasons, Holland was to be
counted as an ally. Commerce and fisheries as the basis of sea power
were to be encouraged, and a military navy was to be built up.
Richelieu left what he called his political will, in which he pointed
out the opportunities of France for achieving sea power, based upon
her position and resources; and French writers consider him the
virtual founder of the navy, not merely because he equipped ships, but
from the breadth of his views and his measures to insure sound
institutions and steady growth. After his death, Mazarin inherited his
views and general policy, but not his lofty and martial spirit, and
during his rule the newly formed navy disappeared. When Louis XIV.
took the government into his own hands, in 1661, there were but thirty
ships of war, of which only three had as many as sixty guns. Then
began a most astonishing manifestation of the work which can be done
by absolute government ably and systematically wielded. That part of
the administration which dealt with trade, manufactures, shipping, and
colonies, was given to a man of great practical genius, Colbert, who