to give, Louis came to have feelings of bitter enmity against Holland;
and as these feelings were shared by Charles II., the two kings
determined on the destruction of the United Provinces. This war, which
broke out in 1672, though more contrary to natural feeling on the part
of England, was less of a political mistake for her than for France,
and especially as regards sea power. France was helping to destroy a
probable, and certainly an indispensable, ally; England was assisting
in the ruin of her greatest rival on the sea, at this time, indeed,
still her commercial superior. France, staggering under debt and utter
confusion in her finances when Louis mounted the throne, was just
seeing her way clear in 1672, under Colbert's reforms and their happy
results. The war, lasting six years, undid the greater part of his
work. The agricultural classes, manufactures, commerce, and the
colonies, all were smitten by it; the establishments of Colbert
languished, and the order he had established in the finances was
overthrown. Thus the action of Louis--and he alone was the directing
government of France--struck at the roots of her sea power, and
alienated her best sea ally. The territory and the military power of
France were increased, but the springs of commerce and of a peaceful
shipping had been exhausted in the process; and although the military
navy was for some years kept up with splendor and efficiency, it soon
began to dwindle, and by the end of the reign had practically
disappeared. The same false policy, as regards the sea, marked the
rest of this reign of fifty-four years. Louis steadily turned his back
upon the sea interests of France, except the fighting-ships, and
either could not or would not see that the latter were of little use
and uncertain life, if the peaceful shipping and the industries, by
which they were supported, perished. His policy, aiming at supreme
power in Europe by military strength and territorial extension, forced
England and Holland into an alliance, which, as has before been said,