directly drove France off the sea, and indirectly swamped Holland's
power thereon. Colbert's navy perished, and for the last ten years of
Louis' life no great French fleet put to sea, though there was
constant war. The simplicity of form in an absolute monarchy thus
brought out strongly how great the influence of government can be upon
both the growth and the decay of sea power.

The latter part of Louis' life thus witnessed that power failing by
the weakening of its foundations, of commerce, and of the wealth that
commerce brings. The government that followed, likewise absolute, of
set purpose and at the demand of England, gave up all pretence of
maintaining an effective navy. The reason for this was that the new
king was a minor; and the regent, being bitterly at enmity with the
king of Spain, to injure him and preserve his own power, entered into
alliance with England. He aided her to establish Austria, the
hereditary enemy of France, in Naples and Sicily to the detriment of
Spain, and in union with her destroyed the Spanish navy and
dock-yards. Here again is found a personal ruler disregarding the sea
interests of France, ruining a natural ally, and directly aiding, as
Louis XIV. indirectly and unintentionally aided, the growth of a
mistress of the seas. This transient phase of policy passed away with
the death of the regent in 1726; but from that time until 1760 the
government of France continued to disregard her maritime interests. It
is said, indeed, that owing to some wise modifications of her fiscal
regulations, mainly in the direction of free trade (and due to Law, a
minister of Scotch birth), commerce with the East and West Indies
wonderfully increased, and that the islands of Guadeloupe and
Martinique became very rich and thriving but both commerce and
colonies lay at the mercy of England when war came, for the navy fell
into decay. In 1756, when things were no longer at their worst, France