had but forty-five ships-of-the-line, England nearly one hundred and
thirty; and when the forty-five were to be armed and equipped, there
was found to be neither material nor rigging nor supplies; not even
enough artillery. Nor was this all.

"Lack of system in the government," says a French writer, "brought
about indifference, and opened the door to disorder and lack of
discipline. Never had unjust promotions been so frequent; so also
never had more universal discontent been seen. Money and intrigue took
the place of all else, and brought in their train commands and power.
Nobles and upstarts, with influence at the capital and
self-sufficiency in the seaports, thought themselves dispensed with
merit. Waste of the revenues of the State and of the dock-yards knew
no bounds. Honor and modesty were turned into ridicule. As if the
evils were not thus great enough, the ministry took pains to efface
the heroic traditions of the past which had escaped the general wreck.
To the energetic fights of the great reign succeeded, by order of the
court, 'affairs of circumspection.' To preserve to the wasted material
a few armed ships, increased opportunity was given to the enemy. From
this unhappy principle we were bound to a defensive as advantageous to
the enemy as it was foreign to the genius of our people. This
circumspection before the enemy, laid down for us by orders, betrayed
in the long run the national temper; and the abuse of the system led
to acts of indiscipline and defection under fire, of which a single
instance would vainly be sought in the previous century."

A false policy of continental extension swallowed up the resources of
the country, and was doubly injurious because, by leaving defenceless
its colonies and commerce, it exposed the greatest source of wealth to
be cut off, as in fact happened. The small squadrons that got to sea