besides having no colonies, the intermediate link of a peaceful
shipping, and the interests involved in it, are now likewise lacking.
In short, the United States has only one link of the three.

The circumstances of naval war have changed so much within the last
hundred years, that it may be doubted whether such disastrous effects
on the one hand, or such brilliant prosperity on the other, as were
seen in the wars between England and France, could now recur. In her
secure and haughty sway of the seas England imposed a yoke on neutrals
which will never again be borne; and the principle that the flag
covers the goods is forever secured. The commerce of a belligerent can
therefore now be safely carried on in neutral ships, except when
contraband of war or to blockaded ports; and as regards the latter, it
is also certain that there will be no more paper blockades. Putting
aside therefore the question of defending her seaports from capture
or contribution, as to which there is practical unanimity in theory
and entire indifference in practice, what need has the United States
of sea power? Her commerce is even now carried on by others; why
should her people desire that which, if possessed, must be defended at
great cost? So far as this question is economical, it is outside the
scope of this work; but conditions which may entail suffering and loss
on the country by war are directly pertinent to it. Granting therefore
that the foreign trade of the United States, going and coming, is on
board ships which an enemy cannot touch except when bound to a
blockaded port, what will constitute an efficient blockade? The
present definition is, that it is such as to constitute a manifest
danger to a vessel seeking to enter or leave the port. This is
evidently very elastic. Many can remember that during the Civil War,
after a night attack on the United States fleet off Charleston, the
Confederates next morning sent out a steamer with some foreign consuls