ships, except those laden with contraband of war, can come and go
freely, and maintain the commercial relations of the country with the
world outside.

It may be urged that, with the extensive sea-coast of the United
States, a blockade of the whole line cannot be effectively kept up. No
one will more readily concede this than officers who remember how the
blockade of the Southern coast alone was maintained. But in the
present condition of the navy, and, it may be added, with any
additions not exceeding those so far proposed by the government, (1)
the attempt to blockade Boston, New York, the Delaware, the
Chesapeake, and the Mississippi, in other words, the great centres of
export and import, would not entail upon one of the large maritime
nations efforts greater than have been made before. England has at the
same the blockaded Brest, the Biscay coast, Toulon, and Cadiz, when
there were powerful squadrons lying within the harbors. It is true
that commerce in neutral ships can then enter other ports of the
United States than those named; but what a dislocation of the carrying
traffic of the country, what failure of supplies at times, what
inadequate means of transport by rail or water, of dockage, of
lighterage, of warehousing, will be involved in such an enforced
change of the ports of entry! Will there be no money loss, no
suffering, consequent upon this? And when with much pain and expense
these evils have been partially remedied, the enemy may be led to stop
the new inlets as he did the old. The people of the United States will
certainly not starve, but they may suffer grievously. As for supplies
which are contraband of war, is there not reason to fear that the
United States is not now able to go alone if an emergency should
arise?