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1. Since the above was written, the secretary of the navy, in his
report for 1889, has recommended a fleet which would make such a
blockade as here suggested very hazardous.
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The question is eminently one in which the influence of the government
should make itself felt, to build up for the nation a navy which, if
not capable of reaching distant countries, shall at least be able to
keep clear the chief approaches to its own. The eyes of the country
have for a quarter of a century been turned from the sea; the results
of such a policy and of its opposite will be shown in the instance of
France and of England. Without asserting a narrow parallelism between
the case of the United States and either of these, it may safely be
said that it is essential to the welfare of the whole country that the
conditions of trade and commerce should remain, as far as possible,
unaffected by an external war. In order to do this, the enemy must be
kept not only out of our ports, but far away from our coasts. (1) Can
this navy be had without restoring the merchant shipping? It is
doubtful. History has proved that such a purely military sea power can
be built up by a despot, as was done by Louis XIV.; but though so fair
seeming, experience showed that his navy was like a growth which
having no root soon withers away. But in a representative government
any military expenditure must have a strongly represented interest
behind it, convinced of its necessity. Such an interest in sea power
does not exist, cannot exist here without action by the government.
How such a merchant shipping should be built up, whether by subsidies
or by free trade, by constant administration of tonics or by free
movement in the open air, is not a military but an economical
question. Even had the United States a great national shipping, it may