be doubted whether a sufficient navy would follow; the distance which
separates her from other great powers, in one way a protection, is
also a snare. The motive, if any there be, which will give the United
States a navy, is probably now quickening in the Central American
Isthmus. Let us hope it will not come to the birth too late.

----
1. The word "defence" in war involves two ideas, which for the sake of
precision in thought should be kept separated in the mind. There is
defence pure and simple, which strengthens itself and awaits attack.
This may be called passive defence. On the other hand, there is a view
of defence which asserts that safety for one's self, the real object
of defensive preparation, is best secured by attacking the enemy. In
the matter of seacoast defence, the former method is exemplified by
stationary fortifications, submarine mines, and generally all immobile
works destined simply to stop an enemy if he tries to enter. The
second method comprises all those means and weapons which do not wait
for attack, but go to meet the enemy's fleet, whether it be but for a
few miles, or whether to his own shores. Such a defence may seem to be
really offensive war, but it is not; it becomes offensive only when
its object of attack is changed from the enemy's fleet to the enemy's
country. England defended her own coasts and colonies by stationing
her fleets off the French ports, to fight the French fleet if it came
out. The United States in the Civil War stationed her fleets off the
Southern ports, not because she feared for her own, but to break down
the Confederacy by isolation from the rest of the world, and
ultimately by attacking the ports. The methods were the same; but the
purpose in one case was defensive, in the other offensive.

The confusion of the two ideas leads to much unnecessary wrangling as