nearly exhausted; the iron links which bound her own colonies and the
allied States to her were strained to the utmost, and some had already
snapped. But the military position of the two brothers was also
perilous in the extreme. One being at the river Metaurus, the other in
Apulia, two hundred miles apart, each was confronted by a superior
enemy, and both these Roman armies were between their separated
opponents. This false situation, as well as the long delay of
Hasdrubal's coming, was due to the Roman control of the sea, which
throughout the war limited the mutual support of the Carthaginian
brothers to the route through Gaul. At the very time that Hasdrubal
was making his long and dangerous circuit by land, Scipio had sent
eleven thousand men from Spain by sea to reinforce the army opposed to
him. The upshot was that messengers from Hasdrubal to Hannibal, having
to pass over so wide a belt of hostile country, fell into the hands of
Claudius Nero, commanding the southern Roman army, who thus learned
the route which Hasdrubal intended to take. Nero correctly appreciated
the situation, and, escaping the vigilance of Hannibal, made a rapid
march with eight thousand of his best troops to join the forces in the
north. The junction being effected, the two consuls fell upon
Hasdrubal in overwhelming numbers and destroyed his army; the
Carthaginian leader himself falling in the battle. Hannibal's first
news of the disaster was by the head of his brother being thrown into
his camp. He is said to have exclaimed that Rome would now be mistress
of the world; and the battle of Metaurus is generally accepted as
decisive of the struggle between the two States.

The military situation which finally resulted in the battle of the
Metaurus and the triumph of Rome may be summed up as follows: To
overthrow Rome it was necessary to attack her in Italy at the heart of
her power, and shatter the strongly linked confederacy of which she