was the head. This was the objective. To reach it, the Carthaginians
needed a solid base of operations and a secure line of communications.
The former was established in Spain by the genius of the great Barca
family; the latter was never achieved. There were two lines possible,
--the one direct by sea, the other circuitous through Gaul. The first
was blocked by the Roman sea power, the second imperilled and finally
intercepted through the occupation of northern Spain by the Roman
army. This occupation was made possible through the control of the
sea, which the Carthaginians never endangered. With respect to
Hannibal and his base, therefore, Rome occupied two central positions,
Rome itself and northern Spain, joined by an easy interior line of
communications, the sea; by which mutual support was continually
given. Had the Mediterranean been a level desert of land, in which the
Romans held strong mountain ranges in Corsica and Sardinia, fortified
posts at Tarragona, Lilybaeum, and Messina, the Italian coast-line
nearly to Genoa, and allied fortresses in Marseilles and other points;
had they also possessed an armed force capable by its character of
traversing that desert at will, but in which their opponents were very
inferior and therefore compelled to a great circuit in order to
concentrate their troops, the military situation would have been at
once recognized, and no words would have been too strong to express
the value and effect of that peculiar force. It would have been
perceived, also, that the enemy's force of the same kind might,
however inferior in strength, make an inroad, or raid, upon the
territory thus held, might burn a village or waste a few miles of
borderland, might even cut off a convoy at times, without, in a
military sense, endangering the communications. Such predatory
operations have been carried on in all ages by the weaker maritime
belligerent, but they by no means warrant the inference,
irreconcilable with the known facts, "that neither Rome nor Carthage