could be said to have undisputed mastery of the sea," because "Roman
fleets sometimes visited the coasts of Africa, and Carthaginian fleets
in the same way appeared off the coast of Italy." In the case under
consideration, the navy played the part of such a force upon the
supposed desert; but as it acts on an element strange to most writers,
as its members have been from time immemorial a strange race apart,
without prophets of their own, neither themselves nor their calling
understood, its immense determining influence upon the history of that
era, and consequently upon the history of the world, has been
overlooked. If the preceding argument is sound, it is as defective to
omit sea power from the list of principal factors in the result, as it
would be absurd to claim for it an exclusive influence.

Instances such as have been cited, drawn from widely separated periods
of time, both before and after that specially treated in this work,
serve to illustrate the intrinsic interest of the subject, and the
character of the lessons which history has to teach. As before
observed, these come more often under the head of strategy than of
tactics; they bear rather upon the conduct of campaigns than of
battles, and hence are fraught with more lasting value. To quote a
great authority in this connection, Jomini says: "Happening to be in
Paris near the end of 1851, a distinguished person did me the honor to
ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in fire arms would
cause any great modifications in the way of making war. I replied that
they would probably have an influence upon the details of tactics, but
that in great strategic operations and the grand combinations of
battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the application of
the principles which had led to the success of great generals in all
ages; of Alexander and Caesar, as well as of Frederick and Napoleon."
This study has become more than ever important now to navies, because