The wars of Islamism, the Crusades, the Thirty Years' War, the wars of
the League, present nearly the same characteristics. Often religion is
the pretext to obtain political power, and the war is not really one of
dogmas. The successors of Mohammed cared more to extend their empire
than to preach the Koran, and Philip II., bigot as he was, did not
sustain the League in France for the purpose of advancing the Roman
Church. We agree with M. Ancelot that Louis IX., when he went on a
crusade in Egypt, thought more of the commerce of the Indies than of
gaining possession of the Holy Sepulcher.

The dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful ally; for
it excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a party. For
instance, the Swedes in the Thirty Years' War, and Philip II. in France,
had allies in the country more powerful than their armies. It may,
however, happen, as in the Crusades and the wars of Islamism, that the
dogma for which the war is waged, instead of friends, finds only bitter
enemies in the country invaded; and then the contest becomes fearful.

The chances of support and resistance in wars of political opinions are
about equal. It may be recollected how in 1792 associations of fanatics
thought it possible to propagate throughout Europe the famous
declaration of the rights of man, and how governments became justly
alarmed, and rushed to arms probably with the intention of only forcing
the lava of this volcano back into its crater and there extinguishing
it. The means were not fortunate; for war and aggression are
inappropriate measures for arresting an evil which lies wholly in the
human passions, excited in a temporary paroxysm, of less duration as it
is the more violent. Time is the true remedy for all bad passions and
for all anarchical doctrines. A civilized nation may bear the yoke of a
factious and unrestrained multitude for a short interval; but these