storms soon pass away, and reason resumes her sway. To attempt to
restrain such a mob by a foreign force is to attempt to restrain the
explosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is far
better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater than to
try to prevent it and to perish in the attempt.

After a profound study of the Revolution, I am convinced that, if the
Girondists and National Assembly had not been threatened by foreign
armaments, they would never have dared to lay their sacrilegious hands
upon the feeble but venerable head of Louis XVI. The Girondists would
never have been crushed by the Mountain but for the reverses of
Dumouriez and the threats of invasion. And if they had been permitted to
clash and quarrel with each other to their hearts' content, it is
probable that, instead of giving place to the terrible Convention, the
Assembly would slowly have returned to the restoration of good,
temperate, monarchical doctrines, in accordance with the necessities and
the immemorial traditions of the French.

In a military view these wars are fearful, since the invading force not
only is met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed to the attacks of
an exasperated people. It may be said that the violence of one party
will necessarily create support for the invaders by the formation of
another and opposite one; but, if the exasperated party possesses all
the public resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it is
supported by a large majority of the people, of what avail will be the
support of the faction which possesses no such means? What service did
one hundred thousand Vendeans and one hundred thousand Federalists do
for the Coalition in 1793?

History contains but a single example of a struggle like that of the