own right, and can alienate or destroy without injury to any other
person. Without this limitation, confidence must run on without end, the
second person may tell the secret to the third upon the same principle
as he received it from the first, and the third may hand it forward to a
fourth, till at last it is told in the round of friendship to them from
whom it was the first intention chiefly to conceal it.

13. The confidence which _Caius_ has of the faithfulness of _Titius_ is
nothing more than an opinion which himself cannot know to be true, and
which _Claudius_, who first tells his secret to _Caius_, may know, at
least may suspect to be false; and therefore the trust is transferred by
_Caius_, if he reveal what has been told him, to one from whom the
person originally concerned would probably have withheld it; and
whatever may be the event, _Caius_ has hazarded the happiness of his
friend, without necessity and without permission, and has put that trust
in the hand of fortune was given only to virtue.

14. All the arguments upon which a man who is telling the private
affairs of another may ground his confidence in security, he must upon
reflection know to be uncertain, because he finds them without effect
upon himself. When he is imagining that _Titius_ will be cautious from a
regard to his interest, his reputation, or his duty, he ought to reflect
that he is himself at that instant acting in opposition to all these
reasons, and revealing what interest, reputation and duty direct him to
conceal.

15. Every one feels that he should consider the man incapable of trust,
who believed himself at liberty to tell whatever he knew to the first
whom he should conclude deserving of his confidence: therefore _Caius_,
in admitting _Titius_ to the affairs imparted only to himself, violates