his faith, since he acts contrary to the intention of _Claudius_, to
whom that faith was given. For promises of friendship are, like all
others, useless and vain, unless they are made in some known sense,
adjusted and acknowledged by both parties.

16. I am not ignorant that many questions may be started relating to the
duty of secrecy, where the affairs are of public concern; where
subsequent reasons may arise to alter the appearance and nature of the
trust; that the manner in which the secret was told may change the
degree of obligation; and that the principles upon which a man is chosen
for a confidant may not always equally constrain him.

17. But these scruples, if not too intricate, are of too extensive
consideration for my present purpose, nor are they such as generally
occur in common life; and though casuistical knowledge be useful in
proper hands, yet it ought by no means to be carelessly exposed, since
most will use it rather to lull than awaken their own consciences; and
the threads of reasoning, on which truth is suspended, are frequently
drawn to such subtility, that common eyes cannot perceive, and common
sensibility cannot feel them.

18. The whole doctrine as well as practice of secrecy is so perplexing
and dangerous, that, next to him who is compelled to trust, I think him
unhappy who is chosen to be trusted; for he is often involved in
scruples without the liberty of calling in the help of any other
understanding; he is frequently drawn into guilt, under the appearance
of friendship and honesty; and sometimes subjected to suspicion by the
treachery of others, who are engaged without his knowledge in the same
schemes; for he that has one confidant has generally more, and when he
is at last betrayed, is in doubt on whom he shall fix the crime.