must needs die, or suffer any thing else, rather than whether we shall
be acting unjustly.

_Cri._ You appear to me to speak wisely, Socrates, but see what we are
to do.

_Socr._ Let us consider the matter together, my friend, and if you have
any thing to object to what I say, make good your objection, and I will
yield to you, but if not, cease, my excellent friend, to urge upon me
the same thing so often, that I ought to depart hence against the will
of the Athenians. For I highly esteem your endeavors to persuade me thus
to act, so long as it is not against my will Consider, then, the
beginning of our inquiry, whether it is stated to your entire
satisfaction, and endeavor to answer the question put to you exactly as
you think right.

_Cri._ I will endeavor to do so.

10. _Socr._ Say we, then, that we should on no account deliberately
commit injustice, or may we commit injustice under certain
circumstances, under others not? Or is it on no account either good or
honorable to commit injustice, as we have often agreed on former
occasions, and as we just now said? Or have all those our former
admissions been dissipated in these few days, and have we, Crito, old
men as we are, been for a long time seriously conversing with each other
without knowing that we in no respect differ from children? Or does the
case, beyond all question, stand as we then determined? Whether the
multitude allow it or not, and whether we must suffer a more severe or a
milder punishment than this, still is injustice on every account both
evil and disgraceful to him who commits it? Do we admit this, or not?