appear, and will appear, to be true. They, then, to whom these things
appear true, and they to whom they do not, have no sentiment in common,
and must needs despise each other, while they look to each other's
opinions. Consider well, then, whether you coincide and think with me,
and whether we can begin our deliberations from this point--that it is
never right either to do an injury or to return an injury, or when one
has been evil-entreated, to revenge one's self by doing evil in return,
or do you dissent from, and not coincide in this principle? For so it
appears to me, both long since and now, but if you in any respect think
otherwise, say so and inform me. But if you persist in your former
opinions, hear what follows.

_Cri._ I do persist in them, and think with you. Speak on, then.

_Socr._ I say next, then, or rather I ask; whether when a man has
promised to do things that are just he ought to do them, or evade his
promise?

_Cri._ He ought to do them.

11. _Socr._ Observe, then, what follows. By departing hence without the
leave of the city, are we not doing evil to some, and that to those to
whom we ought least of all to do it, or not? And do we abide by what we
agreed on as being just, or do we not?

_Cri._ I am unable to answer your question, Socrates; for I do not
understand it.

_Socr._ Then, consider it thus. If, while we were preparing to run away,
or by whatever name we should call it, the laws and commonwealth should