he had informed Russell that Seward would be the Secretary of State and
had expressed the fear that with regard to Great Britain he would be "a
dangerous Foreign Minister[85]." Lincoln was still in Illinois and the
constituency of the Cabinet was yet uncertain, but Seward's voice was
sure to be a powerful one. Occasionally Lyons found some opportunity to
talk with him. On February 4, 1861, in an official letter to Russell,
Lyons reported at length an interview with Seward, in which the latter
had expressed his extreme confidence that the trouble in America was but
superficial and that union sentiment in the South would soon
prevail[86]. In a private letter of the same date, however, Lyons
asserted that Seward was indeed likely to be a very dangerous Secretary
of State. He had told Lyons that if European governments interfered to
protect their commerce, he could unite America by a foreign war in order
to resist such interference[87]. Again, on February 12, while himself
expressing hope that a solution might be found for the difficulties in
America, Lyons warned Russell that there were those who would solve
these difficulties by a foreign war, especially if foreign governments
refused to acknowledge a United States declaration without formal
blockade closing the Southern ports[88]. Writing privately, Lyons
exhibited great anxiety in regard to Seward's attitude and suggested
that the best safeguard would be close union by England and France, for
if these two governments took exactly the same stand in regard to trade,
Seward would hardly dare to carry out his threat[89].

Lyons' letter of February 4 called out from Russell an instruction in
which it was repeated that advice to either party should be withheld and
a strictly neutral attitude maintained, and Russell concluded by an
assertion that if the United States attempted a jingo policy toward
England, the British Cabinet would be tolerant because of its feeling of
strength but that "blustering demonstrations" must not be carried too