far[90]. Even as early as December, 1860, Russell had foreseen the
possibility of what he considered a mere jingo policy for home effect in
America. Now, however, upon the repeated expression of fears from Lyons
that this might be more than mere "bunkum," Russell began to instruct
Lyons not to permit English dignity to be infringed, while at the same
time desiring him to be cautious against stirring American antagonism.
Lyons' earlier disquietude seems, indeed, to have passed away for a
time, and on February 26 he wrote that everyone was waiting to see what
Lincoln would do when inaugurated, that there was still hope of
compromise, and that in his own view this was still possible. In this
letter the tone is more important than the matter, and so far as Lyons
is concerned the tone is all distinctly hopeful, all favourable to a
resumption of normal relations between the North and South. He at least
had no hope of disruption, and no happiness in it[91].

Before this communication could reach England Russell had thoroughly
awakened to the seriousness of the American situation in relation to
British foreign trade. On March 9, writing privately to Lyons, he
stated, "I hope you are getting on well with the new President. If he
blockades the Southern ports we shall be in a difficulty. But according
to all American doctrine it must be an actual blockade kept up by an
efficient force[92]." Thus, before any act had really occurred in
America, the matter of a blockade was occupying the attention of British
statesmen. One difficulty at the time was that there was no one in
England qualified to speak for the new administration at Washington.
Dallas, the American Minister appointed under the Buchanan
administration, while, unlike some other diplomatic representatives
abroad, faithful to the cause of the United States, was nevertheless not
wholly trusted by Lincoln or by Seward, and was thus handicapped in
representing to Russell American conditions or intentions. Indeed he had