well as juries.

Judge Pitman then proceeds to argue that criminal trials without juries
would be attended with disadvantages, because he thinks that judges
would have, oftener than juries, that "reasonable doubt" which by law
entitles the accused to an acquittal. This warrants one of two
inferences: either the writer would have men convicted whose guilt is
involved in "reasonable doubt," or he fears that the learning and
experience of the bar and the bench tend to unfit the mind to weigh the
evidence of guilt or innocence. It is curious that in a former number of
the same Review, another learned writer expressed exactly the contrary
opinion.[A] Mr. Edward A. Thomas thinks that "judges are too much
inclined to convict persons charged with criminal offences," and that
juries are too much inclined to acquit them. And Judge Foster seemingly
agrees with Mr. Thomas upon this point.

[Footnote A: N.A. Review, No. CCCIV, March, 1882.]

Again: Judge Pitman argues that a jury is better qualified than a judge
to determine what is "due care." And Judge Foster, going still further,
says, "common men belonging to various walks in life, are, in most
cases, better fitted to decide correctly ordinary questions of fact
than any single judge or bench of judges." There are, unquestionably,
many cases in which the main questions are so entirely within the scope
of ordinary men's observation and experience that no special knowledge
is required to decide them. With respect to such cases, it is true that

"A few strong instincts and a few plain rules
Are worthy all the learning of the schools."