But where the questions involved are many in number, intricate and
complicated in character, and enveloped in a mass of conflicting
testimony requiring many days to hear it, is it not manifest that a
jury,--not one of whom has taken a note during the trial, some of whose
members have heard as though hearing not, and seen as though seeing not,
the testimony and the witnesses,--deals with such a case at a great
disadvantage, as compared with a judge whose notes contain all the
material testimony, and who has all the opportunity for rest and
relaxation that he may require before filing the finding which is his
verdict? With respect to such cases, it is clear that, as a learned
English judge has said, "the securities which can be taken for justice
in the case of a trial by a judge without a jury, are infinitely greater
than those which can be taken for trial by a judge and jury."[A] A judge
may be required to state what facts he finds, as well as the general
conclusion at which he has arrived, and to state upon what views of the
legal questions he has acted.

[Footnote A: Stephen's History of the Criminal Law, 568.]

Judge Foster most justly remarks: "There can be no such thing as a good
jury trial without the co-operation of a learned, upright, conscientious
and efficient presiding judge, ... holding firmly and steadily the
reins, and guiding the entire proceedings." This is what Judge Foster
was, and what Judge Pitman is, accustomed to do. But if the jury
requires such "guiding" from the court, and if the court is competent
thus to guide them, it is clear that the court must know the way and
must be able to follow it; otherwise it could not so guide the jury.

Judge Pitman also argues that the jury can eliminate "the personal
equation" better than the judge. But is this so? Does education count