Consuls and their Ministers administered the executive affairs. The
Senate, sitting in dignified ease, was merely to safeguard the
constitution, to elect the Grand Elector, and to select the members of
the _Corps Législatif_ (proper) and the Tribunate.

Distrust of the former almost superhuman activity in law-making now
appeared in divisions, checks, and balances quite ingenious in their
complexity. The Legislature was divided into three councils: the
_Corps Législatif_, properly so called, which listened in silence to
proposals of laws offered by the Council of State and criticised or
orally approved by the Tribunate.[131] These three bodies were not
only divided, but were placed in opposition, especially the two
talking bodies, which resembled plaintiff and defendant pleading
before a gagged judge. But even so the constitution was not
sufficiently guarded against Jacobins or royalists. If by any chance a
dangerous proposal were forced through these mutually distrustful
bodies, the Senate was charged with the task of vetoing it, and if the
Grand Elector, or any other high official, strove to gain a perpetual
dictatorship, the Senate was at once to _absorb_ him into its ranks.

Moreover, lest the voters should send up too large a proportion of
Jacobins or royalists, the first selection of members of the great
Councils and the chief functionaries for local affairs was to be made
by the Consuls, who thus primarily exercised not only the "power from
above," but also the "confidence" which ought to have come from below.
Perhaps this device was necessary to set in motion Sieyès' system of
wheels within wheels; for the Senate, which was to elect the Grand
Elector, by whom the executive officers were indirectly to be chosen,
was in part self-sufficient: the Consuls named the first members, who
then co-opted, that is, chose the new members. Some impulse from