During this same visit and frequently afterwards Rawlins, in a white
rage, inveighed against the desperate practice of blindly assaulting
fortified lines, and denounced in unmeasured terms all who favored them
or failed to make adequate preparation for success, where any just
excuse could be found for resorting to them. It is worthy of remark,
without reference to the origin of the practice, or to the persons who
were responsible for it, that General Grant alone had the power to stop
it, and that later there was a noticeable change in the Army of the
Potomac in regard to that practice, although it should be noted that
Sherman followed it as an example in his desperate, but unsuccessful
assault of the enemy's impregnable fortifications on Kenesaw Mountain,
for the purpose, as he frankly explained, of showing that his army
could also assault strongly fortified lines.

That such a costly practice could spring up and obtain imitation in our
army is a striking commentary upon the lack of intelligent supervision
over the essential details of its daily operations. It affords ample
justification for again calling attention to the fact that in this
respect the Confederate Army was much better off and more fortunate
than the Union Army. Its generals, although not without fault, were
much more careful in the management of their military details than ours
were. Jefferson Davis was himself an educated soldier of great
capacity, and selected none but educated and experienced military men
for high command. While Lee's staff was far from faultless in
organization, he had supreme authority in the field, with no army or
independent corps commanders between him and the troops. His army corps
were led by generals of the first rank, who took their orders directly
from him, and no unnecessary time was lost in their transmission or
execution, nor was there any uncertainty as to whose duty it was to