work out and superintend the details of attack and defence. But
whatever may be said in further elucidation of this important subject,
I cannot help expressing regret that General Smith, who had shown such
rare talents in another field, for planning and executing the most
complicated movements, should not have had in this an opportunity to
add to his fame, instead of being sent out as a subordinate to a
general who, however great his talents as a lawyer and a militiaman,
had developed no special aptitude as an army commander. In this
connection the important fact should he recalled that Generals Barnard
and Meigs, officers of the highest training and distinction, at the
request of General Grant, shortly after the fiasco of Bermuda Hundred,
had been sent by the Washington authorities to make an investigation of
General Butler's fitness for command in the field, and had with due
deliberation reported that while "General Butler was a man of rare and
great ability, he had not had either the training or experience to
enable him to direct and control movements in battle." It was doubtless
the verification of this report to Grant's satisfaction that caused him
finally to relieve that General from duty in the field, and in doing so
to incur both his active and his covert hostility.

Meanwhile however valid and important, in either a military or a
political sense, the considerations may have been which sent Butler out
in command of an army with such men as Smith and Gilmore, both
professional soldiers of the highest standing, as his subordinates, the
arrangement was unfortunate from beginning to end, and from its very
nature it was foredoomed to failure. It is to be observed that while
these admirable soldiers were constantly with their troops moving
against or confronting the enemy, Butler was generally at Fortress
Monroe, or at a more central point some distance in the rear, and when
his orders were not ill-timed or inapplicable to the case in hand, they