were not infrequently deemed impracticable, or at cross purposes with
the convictions of the generals whose duty it was to carry them into
effect. The simple and incontrovertible fact is that General Butler's
presence with that army was from the start embarrassing if not
absolutely unnecessary. It interposed an intermediate commander between
the generalissimo and two entire army corps, and however good the
intentions of that commander or great his abilities, his principal
influence was necessarily to derange and delay the orderly conduct and
development of the campaign. It was productive of no good whatever, and
was besides in direct violation of the rule of experience which teaches
that better results are to be expected with one poor commander in full
authority than with two or more good ones liable to pull against each
other.

The chief conclusion to be reached from these considerations, and from
a study of the records, in connection with the writings and unpublished
memoirs of General Smith, is that his conduct during the continuance,
of the arrangement was not only natural and blameless, but that the
failure of Butler's army to play an important and decisive part, was
due primarily, if not entirely, to Butler's own misunderstanding or
mismanagement of what was entrusted to him, or the inherent defects in
the organization and staff arrangements of the Union forces operating
in Virginia. Under the conditions as they actually existed, effective
co-operation and control, it has been shown, could not have been
reasonably expected, and for this the verdict of the military critic
and historian must be that the Lieutenant General who had ample power,
if he chose to exercise it, was primarily responsible. Under the
incontrovertible facts of the case it is difficult to see how this
conclusion can be avoided.