it; and I might enlarge here upon the first fault, namely, of making the
promise, which, say the strict objectors, they should not do. But the
tradesman's answer is this: all those promises ought to be taken as they
are made--namely, with a contingent dependence upon the circumstances of
trade, such as promises made them by others who owe them money, or the
supposition of a week's trade bringing in money by retail, as usual,
both of which are liable to fail, or at least to fall short; and this
the person who calls for the money knows, and takes the promise with
those attending casualties; which if they fail, he knows the shopkeeper,
or whoever he is, must fail him too.

The case is plain, if the man had the money in cash, he need not make a
promise or appointment for a farther day; for that promise is no more or
less than a capitulation for a favour, a desire or condition of a week's
forbearance, on his assurance, that if possible he will not fail to pay
him at the time. It is objected, that the words _if possible_ should
then be mentioned, which would solve the morality of the case: to this
I must answer, that I own I think it needless, unless the man to whom
the promise was made could be supposed to believe the promise was to be
performed, whether it were possible or no; which no reasonable man can
be supposed to do.

There is a parallel case to this in the ordinary appointment of people
to meet either at place or time, upon occasions of business. Two friends
make an appointment to meet the next day at such a house, suppose a
tavern at or near the Exchange: one says to the other, 'Do not fail me
at that time, for I will certainly be there;' the other answers, 'I will
not fail.' Some people, who think themselves more religious than others,
or at least would be thought so, object against these positive
appointments, and tell us we ought to say, 'I will, if it pleases God.'