4th inst. I beg to acquaint you that, being convinced--not only
from the conduct of the crew of this ship during the attack on the
4th, but from what I observed in regard to the other vessels--that
nothing beneficial to His Imperial Majesty's service could be
effected by any attempts to combine the whole squadron in an
attack against the enemy--but, on the contrary, from the imperfect
and incongruous manner in which the vessels are manned--
consequences of the most serious nature would ensue from any
further attempt of the kind. I have therefore determined to take
the squadron to Moro San Paulo, for the adoption of other measures
essential under such circumstances, viz. to take on board such officers
and men from the bad sailing vessels as will render the _Pedro
Primiero_ more effective than the whole squadron as now constituted.

In the first conversation I had with you, I gave you my opinion
as to the superior benefit of equipping one or two vessels _well_--
rather than many imperfectly, and I again beg to press on your
consideration the necessity of such efficient equipment of all
vessels, whether many or few. I must also remind you of the great
danger that arises from the employment of Portuguese of the
inferior class in active operations against their own countrymen,
because they neither do nor can consider that the dispute between
Brazil and the Portuguese Government, bears any similarity to warfare
as ordinarily understood. I have had sufficient proof since
leaving Rio de Janeiro, that there is no more trust to be placed in
Portuguese, when employed to fight against their countrymen, than
there was in the Spaniards, who, on the opposite side of this continent,
betrayed the patriot Governments, by whom they were employed.
I shall press this point no further than to say, that so long as His
Imperial Majesty's ships are so manned, I shall consider them