as not only wholly inefficient, but requiring to be vigilantly watched
in order to prevent the most dangerous consequences.

Since making my arrangements at the Moro, where I left all
the squadron except this ship and the _Maria de Gloria_, I have been
constantly off the port of Bahia, but could see nothing of the
enemy's squadron, till the 20th, when I learned from an English
vessel that they had been as far down as the Abrolhos shoals, for
what purpose I know not. They consist of thirteen vessels, being
the number which we encountered on the 4th. I am watching an
opportunity to attack them in the night, in the hope not only of
being able to damage them materially by the fire of this ship, but
also in the expectation that, if they are not better disciplined than
the crews of this squadron, they will occasion as much damage
amongst themselves, as they would sustain if they had an equal
force to contend with. In the meantime we are as effectually
blockading Bahia, as if the enemy did not dare to remove from his
anchorage--for both this ship and the _Maria de Gloria_ outsail them
all. We have captured three Portuguese vessels, and from the
letters found therein, many more are expected from Maranham and
other ports to leeward, as well as from San Mattheos.

Should the enemy's squadron return to port before I can obtain
a favourable opportunity of assailing them at sea, I shall endeavour
to attack them at their anchorage, and the Government may be
assured that no exertion shall be wanting on my part, or on that of
the officers now in this ship, to effect their destruction.

I may fairly ascribe the prepared state of the enemy, and the
great force in which they appeared on the 4th, and still exhibit--to