there is this difference to be maintained in all the four
perturbations: we are to consider whether our discourse had better be
directed to perturbations in general, which are a contempt of reason,
or a somewhat too vehement appetite; or whether it would be better
applied to particular descriptions, as, for instance, to fear, lust,
and the rest, and whether it appears preferable to endeavor to remove
that which has occasioned the grief, or rather to attempt wholly to
eradicate every kind of grief. As, should any one grieve that he is
poor, the question is, Would you maintain poverty to be no evil, or
would you contend that a man ought not to grieve at anything? Certainly
this last is the best course; for should you not convince him with
regard to poverty, you must allow him to grieve; but if you remove
grief by particular arguments, such as I used yesterday, the evil of
poverty is in some manner removed.

XXVIII. But any perturbation of the mind of this sort may be, as it
were, wiped away by the method of appeasing the mind, if you succeed in
showing that there is no good in that which has given rise to joy and
lust, nor any evil in that which has occasioned fear or grief. But
certainly the most effectual cure is to be achieved by showing that all
perturbations are of themselves vicious, and have nothing natural or
necessary in them. As we see, grief itself is easily softened when we
charge those who grieve with weakness and an effeminate mind; or when
we commend the gravity and constancy of those who bear calmly whatever
befalls them here, as accidents to which all men are liable; and,
indeed, this is generally the feeling of those who look on these as
real evils, but yet think they should be borne with resignation. One
imagines pleasure to be a good, another money; and yet the one may be
called off from intemperance, the other from covetousness. The other
method and address, which, at the same time that it removes the false