opinion, withdraws the disorder, has more subtlety in it; but it seldom
succeeds, and is not applicable to vulgar minds, for there are some
diseases which that medicine can by no means remove. For, should any
one be uneasy because he is without virtue, without courage, destitute
of a sense of duty or honesty, his anxiety proceeds from a real evil;
and yet we must apply another method of cure to him, and such a one as
all the philosophers, however they may differ about other things, agree
in. For they must necessarily agree in this, that commotions of the
mind in opposition to right reason are vicious; and that even admitting
those things to be evils which occasion fear or grief, and those to be
goods which provoke desire or joy, yet that very commotion itself is
vicious; for we mean by the expressions magnanimous and brave, one who
is resolute, sedate, grave, and superior to everything in this life;
but one who either grieves, or fears, or covets, or is transported with
passion, cannot come under that denomination; for these things are
consistent only with those who look on the things of this world as
things with which their minds are unequal to contend.

XXIX. Wherefore, as I before said, the philosophers have all one method
of cure, so that we need say nothing about what sort of thing that is
which disturbs the mind, but we must speak only concerning the
perturbation itself. Thus, first, with regard to desire itself, when
the business is only to remove that, the inquiry is not to be, whether
that thing be good or evil which provokes lust, but the lust itself is
to be removed; so that whether whatever is honest is the chief good, or
whether it consists in pleasure, or in both these things together, or
in the other three kinds of goods, yet should there be in any one too
vehement an appetite for even virtue itself, the whole discourse should
be directed to the deterring him from that vehemence. But human nature,
when placed in a conspicuous point of view, gives us every argument for