the enemy sets about dislodging us, to develop the utmost energy of
counter-attack which our force and opportunities justify.

Now if we consider that by universal agreement it is no longer possible in
the present conditions of land warfare to draw a line between tactics and
minor strategy, we have in our favour for all practical purposes the
identical position which Moltke regarded as constituting the strongest form
of war. That is to say, our major strategy is offensive and our minor
strategy is defensive.

If, then, the limited form of war has this element of strength over and
above the unlimited form, it must be correct to use it when we are not
strong enough to use the more exhausting form and when the object is
limited; just as much as it is correct to use the defensive when our object
is negative and we are too weak for the offensive. The point is of the
highest importance, for it is a direct negation of the current doctrine
that in war there can be but one legitimate object, the overthrow of the
enemy's means of resistance, and that the primary objective must always be
his armed forces. It raises in fact the whole question as to whether it is
not sometimes legitimate and even correct to aim directly at the ulterior
object of the war.

An impression appears to prevail--in spite of all that Clausewitz and
Jomini had to say on the point--that the question admits of only one
answer. Von der Goltz, for instance, is particularly emphatic in asserting
that the overthrow of the enemy must always be the object in modern war. He
lays it down as "the first principle of modern warfare," that "the
immediate objective against which all our efforts must be directed is the
hostile main army." Similarly Prince Kraft has the maxim that "the first
aim should be to overcome the enemy's army. Everything else, the occupation