of the country, &c., only comes in the second line."

It will be observed that he here admits that the process of occupying the
enemy's territory is an operation distinct from the overthrow of the
enemy's force. Von der Goltz goes further, and protests against the common
error of regarding the annihilation of the enemy's principal army as
synonymous with the complete attainment of the object. He is careful to
assert that the current doctrine only holds good "when the two belligerent
states are of approximately the same nature." If, then, there are cases in
which the occupation of territory must be undertaken as an operation
distinct from defeating the enemy's forces, and if in such cases the
conditions are such that we can occupy the territory with advantage without
first defeating the enemy, it is surely mere pedantry to insist that we
should put off till to-morrow what we can do better to-day. If the
occupation of the enemy's whole territory is involved, or even a
substantial part of it, the German principle of course holds good, but all
wars are not of that character.

Insistence on the principle of "overthrow," and even its exaggeration, was
of value, in its day, to prevent a recurrence to the old and discredited
methods. But its work is done, and blind adherence to it without regard to
the principles on which it rests tends to turn the art of war into mere
bludgeon play.

Clausewitz, at any rate, as General Von Caemmerer has pointed out,[7] was
far too practical a soldier to commit himself to so abstract a proposition
in all its modern crudity. If it were true, it would never be possible for
a weaker Power to make successful war against a stronger one in any cause
whatever--a conclusion abundantly refuted by historical experience. That
the higher form like the offensive is the more drastic is certain, if