development. Her power to maintain Korean integrity would be the outward
and visible sign of her ability to assert herself as a Pacific Power. Her
abstract quarrel with Russia could therefore be crystallised into a
concrete objective in the same way as the quarrel of the Western Powers
with Russia in 1854 crystallised into the concrete objective of Sebastopol.

In the Japanese case the immediate political object was exceptionally well
adapted for the use of limited war. Owing to the geographical position of
Korea and to the vast and undeveloped territories which separate it from
the centre of Russian power, it could be practically isolated by naval
action. Further than this, it fulfilled the condition to which Clausewitz
attached the greatest importance--that is to say, the seizure of the
particular object so far from weakening the home defence of Japan would
have the effect of greatly increasing the strength of her position. Though
offensive in effect and intention it was also, like Frederick's seizure of
Saxony, a sound piece of defensive work. So far from exposing her heart, it
served to cover it almost impregnably. The reason is plain. Owing to the
wide separation of the two Russian arsenals at Port Arthur and
Vladivostock, with a defile controlled by Japan interposed, the Russian
naval position was very faulty. The only way of correcting it was for
Russia to secure a base in the Straits of Korea, and for this she had been
striving by diplomatic means at Seoul for some time. Strategically the
integrity of Korea was for Japan very much what the integrity of the Low
Countries was for us, but in the case of the Low Countries, since they were
incapable of isolation, our power of direct action was always comparatively
weak. Portugal, with its unrivalled strategical harbour at Lisbon, was an
analogous case in our old oceanic wars, and since it was capable of being
in a measure isolated from the strength of our great rival by naval means
we were there almost uniformly successful. On the whole it must be said
that notwithstanding the success we achieved in our long series of wars