waged on a limited basis, in none of them were the conditions so favourable
for us as in this case they were for Japan. In none of them did our main
offensive movement so completely secure our home defence. Canada was as
eccentric as possible to our line of home defence, while in the Crimea so
completely did our offensive uncover the British Islands, that we had to
supplement our movement against the limited object by sending our main
fighting fleet to hold the exit of the Baltic against the danger of an
unlimited counter-stroke.[8]

[8] The strategical object with which the Baltic fleet was sent was
certainly to prevent a counter-stroke--that is, its main function in our
war plan was negative. Its positive function was minor and diversionary
only. It also had a political object as a demonstration to further our
efforts to form a Baltic coalition against Russia, which entirely failed.
Public opinion mistaking the whole situation expected direct positive
results from this fleet, even the capture of St. Petersburg. Such an
operation would have converted the war from a limited one to an unlimited
one. It would have meant the "overthrow of the enemy," a task quite
beyond the strength of the allies without the assistance of the Baltic
Powers, and even so their assistance would not have justified changing
the nature of the war, unless both Sweden and Russia had been ready to
make unlimited war and nothing was further from their intention.

Whether or not it was on this principle that the Japanese conceived the war
from the outset matters little. The main considerations are that with so
favourable a territorial object as Korea limited war was possible in its
most formidable shape, that the war did in fact develop on limited lines,
and that it was entirely successful. Without waiting to secure the command
of the sea, Japan opened by a surprise seizure of Seoul, and then under
cover of minor operations of the fleet proceeded to complete her occupation