If the cardinal principle is to put all your strength into the decisive
blow, its corollary is that you should deliver the blow as soon as you
can, for in war time is as precious as lives. Here again it is not easy
to judge whether the Boer Commander-in-Chief is fulfilling his mission.
When the ultimatum expired his forces were spread along the border line
of the Free State and the Transvaal, so that a forward movement would
concentrate them in the northern triangle of Natal. The advance has not
been resisted, and at the end of a week the Transvaal wing of the
combined army has reached a point a few miles north of Glencoe, while
the bulk of the Free State wing is still behind the passes. The movement
has not been rapid, but as the ground is difficult--marches through a
mountainous country and in bad weather always take incomparably longer
than is expected--the delay may be due not to lack of energy but to the
inevitable friction of movement. The mere lapse of time throws no light
on the Boer plan, for though sound strategy counsels rapidity in the
decisive blow, rapidity is a relative term, the pace varying with the
Army, the country, and the weather.

Sir George White's object is not merely to make the time pass until Sir
Redvers Buller's forces come upon the scene. He has also to prevent the
Boers from gaining any great advantage, moral or material. Time could be
gained by a gradual retreat, but that would raise the courage of the
Boer party, and depress the spirits of the British. Accordingly Sir
George White may be expected to take the first opportunity of showing
the Boers that his men are fighters, but he will avoid an engagement
such as might commit a fraction of his force against the Boer main body.
The detachment which was a few days ago near Glencoe may be expected, as
the Boer advance continues, to act as a rear guard, of which the
business is to delay the enemy without running too great a risk of being
itself cut off, or as an advance guard, which is to be reinforced so