guard, and the disappearance both of the railway and of its protectors
would be merely a temporary inconvenience to the British. But if during
the six weeks' respite it were possible to destroy Sir George White's
force the position would be very substantially changed. The confidence
of the Boers would be so increased as to add greatly to their fighting
power, the difficulties of Sir Redvers Buller would be multiplied, the
probability of outside intervention might be brought nearer, and the
Army of invasion to be eventually resisted would be weaker by something
like a quarter. For these reasons I think Sir George White's force the
centre of gravity of the situation. If the Boers cannot defeat it their
case is hopeless; if they can crush it they may have hopes of ultimate
success. That was the bird's-eye view of the whole situation a week ago,
and it still holds good. The week's news does not enable us to judge
whether the Boers have grasped it. You can never be too strong at the
decisive point, and a first-rate general never lets a single man go away
from his main force except for a necessary object important enough to be
worth the risk of a great failure. The capture of Mafeking, of
Kimberley, and even of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, would not compensate the Boers
for failure in Natal. Neither Colonel Baden-Powell nor Colonel Kekewich
would be likely to make a serious inroad into Boer territory. I should
therefore have expected the Boers merely to watch these places with
parties hardly larger than patrols and to have thrown all their energy
into a determined attack on Sir George White. But they seem to have sent
considerable bodies, in each case several thousand men, against both
Mafeking and Kimberley. This proves either that they have a
superabundance of force at their disposal or that they have failed to
grip the situation and to concentrate their minds, their will, and their
troops upon the key of the whole position. I believe the latter to be
the true interpretation.