When the Boers sent their ultimatum they knew that fifty thousand
British troops were under orders for South Africa, and that for six
weeks the British forces in the theatre of war could not be
substantially increased. As they were of opinion that no settlement of
the dispute satisfactory to England could possibly be satisfactory to
themselves they had resolved upon fighting. If we assume, as we are
bound to do, that they had really faced the situation and thought it
out, they must have had in their minds some course of action by which if
they should begin the war on October 11th they would be likely to gain
their end: the recognition of the sovereignty of the Transvaal. They
could hardly expect to disarm the British Empire and dictate peace, but
they might hope to make the occupation of their country so difficult
that Great Britain would be tired of the effort before the moment of
success. The Boer defence taken altogether could hope to do no more than
to gain time, during which some outside embarrassment might cripple
Great Britain; there might be a rising at the Cape, or some other Power
might interfere.

If before the arrival of Sir Redvers Buller and his men the Boers could
destroy a considerable fraction of the British forces now in South
Africa, their chance of prolonging the struggle would be greatly
improved. These forces were in two groups. There was the small army of
Sir George White in Natal, something more than fifteen thousand men, and
there were the detached parties holding points on the colonial railway
system, Naauwport, De Aar, Orange River, Kimberley and Mafeking. These
detachments, however, are largely made up of local levies, and the total
number of British troops among them can hardly amount to three
thousand. The whole set might be captured or otherwise swept from the
board without any material improvement in the Boer position. Sir Redvers
Buller is not tied to the line of railway which most of the detachments