nature of landed property, and again his doctrine as to the "unearned
increment" of value arising from land with the growth of society, are
simply direct deductions from Ricardo's theory of rent, and cannot be
consistently denied by any one who accepts that theory. All that Mill
has done here has been to point the application of principles all but
universally accepted to the practical affairs of life. This is not the
place to consider how far the plan proposed by him for this purpose is
susceptible of practical realization; but it may at least be
confidently stated, that the scientific basis on which his proposal
rests is no strange novelty invented by him, but simply a principle as
fundamental and widely recognized as any within the range of the
science of which it forms a part.

I have just remarked that Mill's originality is less conspicuous in
relation to the economic theory of land than in other problems of
political economy, but the reader must not understand me from this to
say, that he has not very largely contributed to the elucidation of
this topic. He has indeed done so, though not, as is commonly
supposed, by setting aside principles established by his predecessors,
but, as his manner was, while accepting those principles, by
introducing a new premise into the argument. The new premise
introduced in this case was the influence of custom as modifying the
action of competition. The existence of an active competition, on the
one hand between farmers seeking farms, on the other between farming
and other modes of industry as offering inducements to the investment
of capital, is a constant assumption in the reasoning by which Ricardo
arrived at his theory of rent. Granting this assumption, it followed
that farmers as a rule would pay neither higher nor lower rents than
would leave them in possession of the average profits on their capital
current in the country. Mill fully acknowledged the force of this